The criticism that nondual original enlightenment thought undermines proper distinctions between good and evil is not something peculiar to this doctrine but has recurred throughout the history of the Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna denial of duality aims at liberation from attachment by undercutting notions of self-existing entities to which one might cling; in repudiating the idea that there can be “self” independent of “other,” it also serves to foster responsibility and compassion. Its denial of “good” and “evil” as independent ontological entities is not a denial of morality; from the perspective of conventional truth, good and evil must be distinguished. But the Mahāyāna rhetoric of nonduality, such as “saṃsāra is nirvāṇa” and “the defilements are enlightened insight,” has at times been taken as a license to commit evil and exposed the tradition to criticism. (Page 360)

Because original enlightenment is seen as the true status of all phenomena, practice cannot be the “cause” of enlightenment. Thus its role becomes ambiguous. It must undergo redefinition, whether as predisposing one to the insight that “all dharmas are the Buddha-Dharma,” or as solidifying and deepening such insight, or as the exemplary form of the nonduality of the Buddha and the beings. But just as some version of “acquired enlightenment” cannot ultimately be dispensed with, neither can practice, as becomes clear from a close reading of texts. And from the perspective of history, medieval Tendai monks participating in hongaku discourse can be shown to have engaged in diverse forms of religious practice. (Page 359)

A close reading of texts suggests that such statements as “the defilements are none other than enlightened insight” are articulated from the standpoint of having realized nonduality, not that of having yet to realize it. Great as the attempt has been to minimize or even elude it, inevitably, something remains here of the notion of “acquired enlightenment.” We have seen how Nichirenshū scholars in the early decades of the century distinguished between Tendai original enlightenment thought as a statement of naturally inherent enlightenment (jinen hongaku), and Nichiren’s teaching as the actualizing of inherent enlightenment through practice (shikaku soku hongaku). The distinction, however, is overdrawn. Even the nondual Tendai original enlightenment stance remains, ultimately, one of shikaku soku hongaku, for the insight into original enlightenment and the transformation such insight is said to bring about are mediated by the knowledge (or faith) that “all dharmas are the Buddha-Dharma,” achieved at the stage of verbal identity. It is only from the standpoint of this nondual insight that the hongaku doctrine may be accurately characterized as “absolute affirmation.” (Page 358)

The first of the four shared categories was that of the pre-Lotus Sūtra teachings, widely held to be incomplete, in that they denied the possibility of Buddhahood to certain groups: followers of the two “Hinayāna” vehicles of the voice-hearer (śrāvaka) and the condition-perceiver (pratyeka-buddha), women, and evil men. Their relationship to the Lotus Sūtra, however, was an issue of profound disagreement, most particularly between the Tendai and Nichiren Buddhist traditions. Many Tendai scholars maintained that, read in the light of the Lotus, all these earlier teachings could be integrated within the one vehicle as expressions of its various aspects (zettai kaie); from this hermeneutical perspective, the practices associated with them, such as the nenbutsu, could all be regarded as the practice of the Lotus Sūtra. For Nichiren and his later followers, however, all earlier teachings were to be rejected in favor of the Lotus Sūtra, which was to be embraced and practiced exclusively (sōtai kaie). From the standpoint of thought and practice, this represents the greatest point of cleavage between the two traditions. (Page 353)