li symbolizes the object of enlightenment, constituting “truth” and what is real. Truth requires empirical verification and investigation of the real. As Tao-sheng puts it, “li should be verified and realized. This is thus called ‘truth.’ ‘Truth’ denotes investigating what is real. Hence it is called real.” This again is illustrated in a quotation of Tao-sheng by Chūn-cheng (of T’ang):

The Dharma-Master Chu Tao-sheng says: Things are necessarily caused and conditioned, without self-nature (svabhāva). Hence they are not existent. They arise in accordance with cause and conditions. Hence they are not nonexistent. Being not existent and not nonexistent both show the Dharma to be real. Being real, it is referred to as “true” (or supreme). No error, hence it is called “truth.” Contradicting what is “true,” it is called “conventional.” Not “true,” hence it is not “truth.” Therefore what is unreal and what is real are relative to each other, and the designations of “true (supreme)” and “conventional” [truths] are produced.

Here, Tao-sheng seems to suggest that the conventional as such does not constitute “truth,” but the latter is qualified by the former to compose conventional truth as one term; whereas in the case of the real (or supreme) truth, the two words match naturally with each other in their true senses.

The supremacy of the absolute domain over the relative, nonetheless, does not abrogate the value of worldly truth for the enlightened. That is so, not only because li as the symbol of the final reality unites the two domains, but also because it represents an expedient means for helping unenlightened beings. As Sangharakshita aptly puts it, “only by means of the conventional truth could the absolute truth be realized; the one was the stepping-stone to the other.” As cited previously, Taosheng clarifies: “Mahāyānistic enlightenment consists originally in not discarding what is near, the realm of birth-and-death (saṃsāra), to seek it in the far.” That nirvāṇa is not to be sought apart from saṃsāra is a Mahāyāna principle: the Mādhyamika Buddhists arrive at identification of the two by way of the principle of “emptiness.” In light of this and the fact that Tao-sheng does not depart from the Nirvāṇa Sūtra in this, it may be concluded that, as far as the notion of two truths is concerned, Tao-sheng remains a Mahāyānist, though the metaphysical structure behind the argument is shared, and probably reinforced, by neo-Taoist philosophy.